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제롬 파월 연준 의장의 잭슨홀 연설(영문)

기사입력 : 2023년08월25일 23:17

최종수정 : 2023년08월26일 00:20

[휴스턴=뉴스핌] 고인원 특파원= 제롬 파월 연준 의장은 2023년 8월 25일 잭슨홀 심포지엄에서 '글로벌 경제의 구조적 변화'을 주제로 연설했다.

이날 파월은 "인플레이션이 여전히 높으며 적절하다고 판단되면 추가 금리 인상이 가능하다"는 매파 발언으로 시장에 충격파를 던졌다.

다음은 미 연준 홈페이지에 게재된 파월 의장의 연설문 전문이다. 원문 그대로 게재한다.

Good morning. At last year's Jackson Hole symposium, I delivered a brief, direct message. My remarks this year will be a bit longer, but the message is the same: It is the Fed's job to bring inflation down to our 2 percent goal, and we will do so. We have tightened policy significantly over the past year. Although inflation has moved down from its peak—a welcome development—it remains too high. We are prepared to raise rates further if appropriate, and intend to hold policy at a restrictive level until we are confident that inflation is moving sustainably down toward our objective.

Today I will review our progress so far and discuss the outlook and the uncertainties we face as we pursue our dual mandate goals. I will conclude with a summary of what this means for policy. Given how far we have come, at upcoming meetings we are in a position to proceed carefully as we assess the incoming data and the evolving outlook and risks.

The Decline in Inflation So Far
The ongoing episode of high inflation initially emerged from a collision between very strong demand and pandemic-constrained supply. By the time the Federal Open Market Committee raised the policy rate in March 2022, it was clear that bringing down inflation would depend on both the unwinding of the unprecedented pandemic-related demand and supply distortions and on our tightening of monetary policy, which would slow the growth of aggregate demand, allowing supply time to catch up. While these two forces are now working together to bring down inflation, the process still has a long way to go, even with the more favorable recent readings.

On a 12-month basis, U.S. total, or "headline," PCE (personal consumption expenditures) inflation peaked at 7 percent in June 2022 and declined to 3.3 percent as of July, following a trajectory roughly in line with global trends (figure 1, panel A).1 The effects of Russia's war against Ukraine have been a primary driver of the changes in headline inflation around the world since early 2022. Headline inflation is what households and businesses experience most directly, so this decline is very good news. But food and energy prices are influenced by global factors that remain volatile, and can provide a misleading signal of where inflation is headed. In my remaining comments, I will focus on core PCE inflation, which omits the food and energy components.

On a 12-month basis, core PCE inflation peaked at 5.4 percent in February 2022 and declined gradually to 4.3 percent in July (figure 1, panel B). The lower monthly readings for core inflation in June and July were welcome, but two months of good data are only the beginning of what it will take to build confidence that inflation is moving down sustainably toward our goal. We can't yet know the extent to which these lower readings will continue or where underlying inflation will settle over coming quarters. Twelve-month core inflation is still elevated, and there is substantial further ground to cover to get back to price stability.

To understand the factors that will likely drive further progress, it is useful to separately examine the three broad components of core PCE inflation—inflation for goods, for housing services, and for all other services, sometimes referred to as nonhousing services (figure 2).

Core goods inflation has fallen sharply, particularly for durable goods, as both tighter monetary policy and the slow unwinding of supply and demand dislocations are bringing it down. The motor vehicle sector provides a good illustration. Earlier in the pandemic, demand for vehicles rose sharply, supported by low interest rates, fiscal transfers, curtailed spending on in-person services, and shifts in preference away from using public transportation and from living in cities. But because of a shortage of semiconductors, vehicle supply actually fell. Vehicle prices spiked, and a large pool of pent-up demand emerged. As the pandemic and its effects have waned, production and inventories have grown, and supply has improved. At the same time, higher interest rates have weighed on demand. Interest rates on auto loans have nearly doubled since early last year, and customers report feeling the effect of higher rates on affordability.2 On net, motor vehicle inflation has declined sharply because of the combined effects of these supply and demand factors.

Similar dynamics are playing out for core goods inflation overall. As they do, the effects of monetary restraint should show through more fully over time. Core goods prices fell the past two months, but on a 12-month basis, core goods inflation remains well above its pre-pandemic level. Sustained progress is needed, and restrictive monetary policy is called for to achieve that progress.

In the highly interest-sensitive housing sector, the effects of monetary policy became apparent soon after liftoff. Mortgage rates doubled over the course of 2022, causing housing starts and sales to fall and house price growth to plummet. Growth in market rents soon peaked and then steadily declined (figure 3).3

Measured housing services inflation lagged these changes, as is typical, but has recently begun to fall. This inflation metric reflects rents paid by all tenants, as well as estimates of the equivalent rents that could be earned from homes that are owner occupied.4 Because leases turn over slowly, it takes time for a decline in market rent growth to work its way into the overall inflation measure. The market rent slowdown has only recently begun to show through to that measure. The slowing growth in rents for new leases over roughly the past year can be thought of as "in the pipeline" and will affect measured housing services inflation over the coming year. Going forward, if market rent growth settles near pre-pandemic levels, housing services inflation should decline toward its pre-pandemic level as well. We will continue to watch the market rent data closely for a signal of the upside and downside risks to housing services inflation.

The final category, nonhousing services, accounts for over half of the core PCE index and includes a broad range of services, such as health care, food services, transportation, and accommodations. Twelve-month inflation in this sector has moved sideways since liftoff. Inflation measured over the past three and six months has declined, however, which is encouraging. Part of the reason for the modest decline of nonhousing services inflation so far is that many of these services were less affected by global supply chain bottlenecks and are generally thought to be less interest sensitive than other sectors such as housing or durable goods. Production of these services is also relatively labor intensive, and the labor market remains tight. Given the size of this sector, some further progress here will be essential to restoring price stability. Over time, restrictive monetary policy will help bring aggregate supply and demand back into better balance, reducing inflationary pressures in this key sector.

The Outlook
Turning to the outlook, although further unwinding of pandemic-related distortions should continue to put some downward pressure on inflation, restrictive monetary policy will likely play an increasingly important role. Getting inflation sustainably back down to 2 percent is expected to require a period of below-trend economic growth as well as some softening in labor market conditions.

Economic growth
Restrictive monetary policy has tightened financial conditions, supporting the expectation of below-trend growth.5 Since last year's symposium, the two-year real yield is up about 250 basis points, and longer-term real yields are higher as well—by nearly 150 basis points.6 Beyond changes in interest rates, bank lending standards have tightened, and loan growth has slowed sharply.7 Such a tightening of broad financial conditions typically contributes to a slowing in the growth of economic activity, and there is evidence of that in this cycle as well. For example, growth in industrial production has slowed, and the amount spent on residential investment has declined in each of the past five quarters (figure 4).

But we are attentive to signs that the economy may not be cooling as expected. So far this year, GDP (gross domestic product) growth has come in above expectations and above its longer-run trend, and recent readings on consumer spending have been especially robust. In addition, after decelerating sharply over the past 18 months, the housing sector is showing signs of picking back up. Additional evidence of persistently above-trend growth could put further progress on inflation at risk and could warrant further tightening of monetary policy.

The labor market
The rebalancing of the labor market has continued over the past year but remains incomplete. Labor supply has improved, driven by stronger participation among workers aged 25 to 54 and by an increase in immigration back toward pre-pandemic levels. Indeed, the labor force participation rate of women in their prime working years reached an all-time high in June. Demand for labor has moderated as well. Job openings remain high but are trending lower. Payroll job growth has slowed significantly. Total hours worked has been flat over the past six months, and the average workweek has declined to the lower end of its pre-pandemic range, reflecting a gradual normalization in labor market conditions (figure 5).

This rebalancing has eased wage pressures. Wage growth across a range of measures continues to slow, albeit gradually (figure 6). While nominal wage growth must ultimately slow to a rate that is consistent with 2 percent inflation, what matters for households is real wage growth. Even as nominal wage growth has slowed, real wage growth has been increasing as inflation has fallen.

We expect this labor market rebalancing to continue. Evidence that the tightness in the labor market is no longer easing could also call for a monetary policy response.

Uncertainty and Risk Management along the Path Forward
Two percent is and will remain our inflation target. We are committed to achieving and sustaining a stance of monetary policy that is sufficiently restrictive to bring inflation down to that level over time. It is challenging, of course, to know in real time when such a stance has been achieved. There are some challenges that are common to all tightening cycles. For example, real interest rates are now positive and well above mainstream estimates of the neutral policy rate. We see the current stance of policy as restrictive, putting downward pressure on economic activity, hiring, and inflation. But we cannot identify with certainty the neutral rate of interest, and thus there is always uncertainty about the precise level of monetary policy restraint.

That assessment is further complicated by uncertainty about the duration of the lags with which monetary tightening affects economic activity and especially inflation. Since the symposium a year ago, the Committee has raised the policy rate by 300 basis points, including 100 basis points over the past seven months. And we have substantially reduced the size of our securities holdings. The wide range of estimates of these lags suggests that there may be significant further drag in the pipeline.

Beyond these traditional sources of policy uncertainty, the supply and demand dislocations unique to this cycle raise further complications through their effects on inflation and labor market dynamics. For example, so far, job openings have declined substantially without increasing unemployment—a highly welcome but historically unusual result that appears to reflect large excess demand for labor. In addition, there is evidence that inflation has become more responsive to labor market tightness than was the case in recent decades.8 These changing dynamics may or may not persist, and this uncertainty underscores the need for agile policymaking.

These uncertainties, both old and new, complicate our task of balancing the risk of tightening monetary policy too much against the risk of tightening too little. Doing too little could allow above-target inflation to become entrenched and ultimately require monetary policy to wring more persistent inflation from the economy at a high cost to employment. Doing too much could also do unnecessary harm to the economy.

Conclusion
As is often the case, we are navigating by the stars under cloudy skies. In such circumstances, risk-management considerations are critical. At upcoming meetings, we will assess our progress based on the totality of the data and the evolving outlook and risks. Based on this assessment, we will proceed carefully as we decide whether to tighten further or, instead, to hold the policy rate constant and await further data. Restoring price stability is essential to achieving both sides of our dual mandate. We will need price stability to achieve a sustained period of strong labor market conditions that benefit all.

We will keep at it until the job is done.

koinwon@newspim.com

[뉴스핌 베스트 기사]

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尹부부 공천개입 수사 급물살 타나 [서울=뉴스핌] 박서영 기자 = 윤석열 전 대통령이 탄핵심판 선고에서 헌법재판관 전원일치 의견으로 파면된 가운데 이른바 '명태균 의혹' 사건에 대한 검찰 수사가 윤 전 대통령 부부에 속도를 낼지 이목이 집중된다. 5일 법조계에 따르면 헌법재판소는 4일 오전 11시 윤 전 대통령 탄핵심판 선고기일을 열어 윤 전 대통령의 파면을 결정했다. 박근혜 전 대통령에 이은 헌정 사상 두 번째 파면이다. 사진은 윤석열 전 대통령. [사진=뉴스핌 DB] 검찰은 지난 2월 17일 윤 전 대통령 부부 공천개입 의혹, 여론조사 조작 의혹, 여론조사 비용 대납 의혹 등 명씨 관련 사건을 창원지검에서 중앙지검으로 이송했다. 이후 검찰은 해당 사건과 관련한 연이은 소환조사 및 강제수사 등에 착수하면서 잔여 수사에 속도를 내 왔다. 검찰은 명씨가 실질적으로 운영한 여론조사업체 미래한국연구소가 당시 대선 후보였던 윤 전 대통령을 돕고자 총 81차례에 걸쳐 불법 여론조사를 해 주고, 그 대가로 김영선 전 국민의힘 의원이 2022년 6·1 보궐선거에서 경남 창원 의창 선거구 공천을 받았다는 의혹을 받았다고 보고 있다. 윤 전 대통령의 부인 김건희 여사는 이와 관련, 보궐선거와 지난해 4월 22대 총선 당시 국민의힘 공천 과정에 개입한 의혹을 받는다. 이날 헌재의 결정으로 윤 전 대통령은 현직 대통령으로서 가졌던 '불소추특권'을 잃게 됐다. 기존 수사 대상이던 내란 혐의뿐 아니라 공천 개입 의혹 수사도 피할 수 없게 된다는 의미다. 법조계 안팎은 조기 대선을 앞두고 윤 전 대통령 부부를 향한 공천 개입 의혹 사건 수사가 급물살을 탈 것이라고 내다봤다. 정계 출신 법조인은 "박 전 대통령도 파면된 다음에 소환조사가 바로 이뤄졌다"며 "곧바로는 아니겠지만 민주당 측에서 신속한 수사를 압박할 텐데 검찰도 조만간 협의를 해 윤 전 대통령 부부의 소환 일정 등을 잡으려 할 것"이라고 전망했다. 실제 2016∼2017년 박근혜 정부의 국정농단 사건 때, 박 전 대통령의 탄핵안이 국회에서 가결되고 3개월 만에 헌법재판소가 파면 결정을 내렸다. 당시 검찰과 박영수 특별검사팀의 수사는 박 전 대통령이 자연인 신분이 된 이후 급물살을 탔다. 박 전 대통령은 파면 11일 만에 검찰에 소환됐고, 이후 열흘 만에 구속됐다. 양홍석 변호사(법무법인 이공)는 "윤 전 대통령이 파면됐으니 명태균 수사의 경우 검찰이 좀 더 가열차게 할 것 같고, 공직선거법 위반 사건도 있는데 이 또한 바로 착수해야 하지 않을까 싶다"며 "다만 전직 대통령이기 때문에 신병 문제는 바로 결정하기는 쉽지 않을 수 있다"고 예상했다. 검찰의 신속한 수사는 진행되겠지만, 윤 전 대통령의 소환조사 등은 조기 대선이 끝난 후 이뤄질 것이란 분석도 있었다. 부장검사 출신 변호사는 "대통령이 파면됐으니 적극적으로 윤 전 대통령 부부를 조사하려고 들긴 하겠지만 소환조사의 경우 조기 대선 이후가 될 것 같다"며 "정치적 파장이 큰 사안이라 검찰이 속도를 내서 수사 한다 해도 대선 정국에서 전 대통령 부부를 직격하기는 어렵다"고 했다. 윤석열 전 대통령이 4일 탄핵심판 선고에서 헌법재판관 전원일치 의견으로 파면된 가운데 이른바 '명태균 의혹' 사건에 대한 검찰 수사가 윤 전 대통령 부부를 향할지 이목이 집중된다. 사진은 명태균 씨가 지난해 11월 8일 오전 경남 창원시 창원지방검찰청에 정치자금법 위반 혐의 피의자 신분으로 출석하고 있는 모습. [사진=뉴스핌 DB] seo00@newspim.com 2025-04-05 07:00
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[尹 파면] 조기 대선 막 올랐다 [서울=뉴스핌] 한태희 기자 = 헌법재판소가 윤석열 대통령 파면을 선고하며 조기 대선 막이 올랐다. 현재 조기 대선 레이스에서 이재명 더불어민주당(민주당) 대표가 독주하는 구도다. 여·야 잠룡들은 권력 구조를 개편하는 개헌론으로 차별화에 나서는 등 대권을 향한 행보를 시작했다. [서울=뉴스핌] 한태희 기자 = 2025.04.03 ace@newspim.com 6일 정치권에 따르면 조기 대선은 오는 5월 말에서 6월 초에 치러질 가능성이 높다. 헌법 제68조 2항에 따라 파면 등으로 대통령 궐위 시 60일 이내 선거를 치러야 해서다. 한덕수 대통령 권한대행은 공직선거법 제35조 1항에 따라 늦어도 오는 14일까지 조기 대선일을 공고해야 한다. 조기 대선 레이스에 들어가며 대권을 노리는 후보자 발걸음도 분주해졌다. 선두 주자는 이재명 대표다. 이 대표는 차기 대권 유력 후보자를 묻는 각종 여론조사에서 압도적인 1위를 달리고 있다. 이 대표는 최근 공직선거법 위반 사건 2심에서 무죄를 받으며 사법 리스크 부담도 덜었다. 야권에서는 김경수 전 경남지사, 김동연 경기지사, 김두관 전 국회의원, 김부겸 전 국무총리, 김영록 전남지사, 이광재 전 강원지사, 전재수 의원 등이 당내 경선에 참여할 가능성이 있다. 이들은 '1강'인 이 대표와 비교해 열세다. 야권 잠룡들은 차기 대통령 임기 단축 등 개헌론을 부각하고 있다. 이준석 개혁신당 국회의원도 차기 대권을 넘보고 있다. 이준석 의원은 '40대 기수론' 등 정치권 세대 교체론을 앞세우고 있다. 여권에서는 김문수 고용노동부 장관, 안철수 국회의원, 오세훈 서울시장, 원희룡 전 국토교통부 장관, 유승민 전 국회의원, 한동훈 전 국민의힘 대표, 홍준표 대구시장 등이 조기 대선에 참전할 가능성이 있다. 여권 후보자들은 당내 경선에서 정통 지지자인 보수 표심을 먼저 얻어야 한다. 동시에 본선에서 중도층 표까지 끌어올 수 있는 경쟁력도 보여줘야 한다. 여권 후보자들은 '12·3 비상계엄 사태'를 촉발한 제왕적 대통령제 한계 극복 방안으로 대통령 권한을 분산하는 개헌론을 제시하고 있다. 각 당은 곧 당내 경선을 시작해 본선에 올릴 후보자 선정에 들어간다. 공직선거법 제49조에 따라 조기 대선 24일 전부터 이틀 동안 대통령 후보 등록을 끝내야 하기 때문이다. 조기 대선이 오는 6월 3일 치러지면 각 당은 오는 5월 11일까지 중앙선거관리위원회에 대통령 후보를 등록해야 한다. 여야는 약 8년 전 제19대 대통령 선거 당시 박근혜 대통령 파면이 결정된 후 1개월 안에 대통령 후보 선출을 마무리했다. 범야권이 대통령 단일 후보로 본선에 들어갈지도 주목된다. 당 내 간판 주자가 없는 조국혁신당은 '야권 통합 완전국민경선(오픈프라이머리)'을 제안했다. 이 대표가 있는 민주당이 이에 응할지에 정치권 이목이 쏠리고 있다. ace@newspim.com 2025-04-06 07:00
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